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Climate law and economic policy instruments:
a new field of environmental law
Benjamin J. Richardson*
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto
The Emerging Field of ‘Climate Law’
Although questions hang over the fate of the Kyoto
Protocol,1 the control of greenhouse gases (‘GHGs’) has
become an indelible feature of environmental law regimes
worldwide. Indeed, it is timely to speak of a new field of
environmental law, which could be described as ‘climate
law’. Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and other
industrialised nations are pioneering a raft of policies,
institutions and regulations for GHG emission control,
renewable energy investment and other measures to
minimise global warming. The emerging field of climate
law may be seen as an eclectic offshoot of energy law and
pollution law. Climate law, however, is not simply a collage
of disparate elements from established legal fields. It is
becoming the very core of environmental law, for no
environmental problem is as pervasive or as long-term in
its impact. Controlling global warming, in turn, helps
resolve other environmental problems, such as urban
pollution and biodiversity conservation.
There are several defining characteristics of climate law.
The main characteristic is the extraordinary reliance on
economic policy instruments (‘EPIs’) as the principal means
of influencing energy use and GHG emissions. Indeed, no
field of environmental law relies more on economic
mechanisms. Carbon taxes and tradable pollution
allowances are some of the economic tools being used by
governments.2 This dependence on economic tools can be
explained by the policy problem that the benefits of
reducing GHGs will incur in the future, but the costs will
be borne today. As people tend to have a shallow ethical
commitment to the welfare of posterity, especially over
the time horizons associated with global warming, measures
to avoid dangerous climate change need to appeal primarily
to money rather than to morality. Modern culture is too
heterogeneous and ephemeral to allow shared moral
responsibilities to arise to resolve complex and seemingly
distant environmental problems. Consequently, in the
alternative, we must make markets more environmentally
literate by conveying stronger financial incentives for
companies and individuals to reduce pollution. This will
require harnessing a range of economic instruments and
institutions as a means of climate policy. Governments are
feeble at changing ethics and culture, but have some ability
to alter the economic dynamics of markets.3
Economic instruments as a means of environmental
policy can no longer be considered ‘experimental’. They
have been acknowledged in international environmental law
for over a decade. For example, in 1992 from the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), both Agenda 214 and the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development5 spoke of the seminal role
of EPIs for achieving sustainable development. The well
known ‘polluter pays’ principle appears in the
environmental policy requirements of Article 174 of the
amended Treaty of the European Union.6 The apotheosis of
this trend in international environmental law came with
the Kyoto Protocol, which embodies a range of so-called
‘flexible mechanisms’ including international emissions
trading.
But this international trend is not some homogenous
behemoth, as there are differences between jurisdictions
as to their preferences for specific economic instruments,
and some governments are uninterested in EPIs altogether.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of his
research assistant, Michelle Campbell, in editing this article.
1 ILM (1998) 37, at 22.
2 See, by way of introduction, W.J. Mckibbin and P.J. Wilcoxen,
‘The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy’, Journal of
Environmental Perspectives, (2002) 16(2), at 107.
3 See D. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law
(MIT Press, 2003).
4 N. Robinson (ed.), Agenda 21: Earth’s Action Plan (Oceania
Publications, 1992), 127.
5 ILM (1992) 31, at 874. Principle 16.
6 OJ C340/3 (1997).
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While tradable emissions permits are favoured in the United
States, environmental taxes and other fiscal instruments
are preferred by states of the European Union.7 Such
variations owe more to nations’ particular legal traditions
and political circumstances than careful analysis by policy-
makers of the relative advantages of the various EPIs. This
article reveals why there has been a growing interest in
EPIs, reviews their use in the emerging field of climate
law, and evaluates the effects of the reforms and considers
possible improvements.
Why economic instruments?
Economic policy instruments redefine the costs and benefits
of alternative actions open to economic agents, with the
aim of inducing behaviour that helps protect the
environment. The instruments are much more than an
expression of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and there is a
wide variety of choice.8 The dominant type is price-based
measures, such as pollution taxes or subsidies to stimulate
environmental protection investments. Alternatively, there
are marketable rights-based measures, providing tradable
entitlements to use natural resources or to emit pollutants
within a pre-determined level.9 Other types of EPIs include
liability rules, deposit-refund schemes and performance
bonds.
From the standpoint of environmental policy, the
theoretical literature suggests that EPIs offer several
advantages.10 First, they promote efficiency gains through
reallocation of pollution (for example, carbon) abatement
costs. The costs of pollution reduction typically vary among
firms, and efficient firms should seek to lower their
pollution tax burden by investing in cleaner production
technologies where this is cost effective. The
methodological pluralism of EPIs allows each company to
make cost savings by tailoring the means of reducing
pollution to their own circumstances. Second, EPIs provide
innovation incentives; they give polluters an ongoing
incentive to reduce emissions or save energy, whereas the
financial incentive to exceed prescribed environmental
regulatory standards is usually weaker.11 Third, EPIs can
also generate substantial revenues (for example through
auctioning of tradable pollution allowances or eco-taxes)
that can be recycled for environmental improvement
investments. Apart from economic advantages, it has been
argued that EPIs offer democratic benefits, as they should
enable the public to focus on the fundamental questions
regarding the appropriate level of pollution, such as GHG
emissions, and the costs involved.12 Such big picture issues
may be obscured when the public is expected to focus on
the minutiae of pollution licensing controls.
No doubt, some of the avowed advantages of EPIs
remain speculative, with one OECD survey of international
practice concluding that ‘evidence is limited, assessments
are based on scant data, and in-depth evaluations are
scarce’.13 Importantly, among EPIs there can be differences
in policy instrument effectiveness depending on the
environmental problem to be addressed. For example, taxes
may have advantages over tradable emissions allowances
for controlling pollutants associated with local ‘hot spots’
such as sulphur dioxide.14
The theoretical literature acknowledges that EPIs are
not without limitations. Unlike quantitative pollution
regulation, eco-taxes have uncertain environmental effects,
because it is difficult to predict the response of companies
and consumers to a given tax level.15 Another problem can
arise in large decentralised businesses, where head office
decisions on pollution control in response to an EPI may
not be effectively imparted to the branches. Large firms
preoccupied with multifarious business issues may disregard
costs imposed by eco-taxes or other EPIs as just another
cost of ‘doing business’. Thirdly, in many cases, the
implementation of EPIs requires substantial re-regulation,
7 R.B. Stewart, ‘Economic Incentives for Environmental
Protection: Opportunities and Obstacles’ in R.L. Revesz, P. Sands
and R.B. Stewart (eds), Environmental Law, the Economy and
Sustainable Development (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 171 at
203 to 220.
8 OECD, The Polluter Pays Principle: Definition, Analysis and
Implementation (OECD, 1975). See further M. Massarrat,
‘Sustainability Through Cost Internalisation’, Ecological Economics
(1997) 22(1), at 29.
9 See OECD, How to Apply Economic Instruments (OECD, 1999), at
10.
10 The following discussion draws upon T.H. Tietenberg,
‘Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation’, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy (1990) 6, at 17; T. Requate, ‘Incentives to
Innovate under Emission Taxes and Tradeable Permits’, European
Journal of Political Economy (1998) 14, at 139; R. Stavins and B.
Whitehead, ‘Dealing with Pollution: Market-based Incentives for
Environmental Protection’, Environment (1992) 34, at 30.
11 See R.G. Newell, A.B. Jaffe and R.N. Stavins, ‘The Induced
Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1999) 114(3), at 941.
12 See L. Heinzerling, ‘Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy’,
Stanford Environmental Law Journal (1995) 14, at 300.
13 OECD, Economic Instruments for Pollution Control and Natural
Resources Management in OECD Countries: A Survey (OECD, 1999), at
96.
14 Discussed in B.J. McLean, ‘Evolution of Marketable Permits:
The U.S. Experience with Sulphur Dioxide Allowances’,
International Journal of Environmental and Pollution (1997) 8(1/2), at
9.
15 This problem does not apply to tradable emissions allowances
operating within a pre-determined emissions cap.
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seemingly at odds with the market-based nature of EPIs.16
Fourth, in the absence of equivalent environmental controls
in other countries, industries subject to EPIs may suffer
adverse competitiveness effects.17 A final concern to note
is that EPIs may clash with social policy goals, primarily
because of the regressive effects of environmental taxes,
such as on poor households’ energy budgets.18
Whilst EPIs are obviously market-based in their
methodology, they cannot be crudely equated with market
liberalism dogma, since they are designed to address the
environmental effects of uncoordinated free markets. In
truth, economic instruments are an expression of
‘ecological modernisation’ policy. Ecological modernisation
thinking, which arose in West Germany during the 1980s,
does not perceive any fundamental schism between
capitalism and environmental integrity. Rather, it suggests
that through improved management techniques and
technological solutions, environmental protection and
economic development can be mutually supporting.19 Thus,
businesses that are careful environmental managers should
benefit financially from improvements in the efficiency and
productivity of their operations, such as savings in materials
consumed.20 Incentive-based EPIs are a key means of
achieving this synergy between environmental and
economic goals.
The empirical evidence, however, reveals that businesses
do not generally welcome EPIs, especially taxes. Fossil fuel
industries vehemently opposed a carbon or energy tax when
proposed by the European Union (EU) in the early 1990s.21
Economic instruments can compel industry to pay for what
has been a free lunch under traditional regulation.22 And
EPIs magnify the costs of environmental policy, whereas
such costs are more likely to be obscured under non-
economic policy instruments. Apart from business interests,
environmental organisations may find the idea that
companies may be able to pollute morally distasteful.
Adoption of EPIs has also been slowed by methodological
uncertainties regarding their design and implementation.23
Lately, a more receptive climate for EPIs has been emerging,
and they are being used especially to address global
warming. Hostility has waned as more information about
the effects of EPIs has emerged from academic studies, pilot
projects and other initiatives.24 Governments have also
become more interested in EPIs as a consequence of their
commercialisation of public utilities such as water and
energy supplies. On-going concerns with full cost-recovery
in service and supply have encouraged policy-makers to
look to the market. Command regulation, by contrast, has
been subject to an increasing torrent of criticism owing to
perceived inflexibilities and inefficiencies.25
International climate law and economic
instruments
Enhancing treaty implementation?
Governments’ increased reliance on EPIs as a means of
climate policy stems partly from developments in
international law. A seismic shift in the character of
international environmental treaties recently has seen
greater detail given to the specification of how treaty
obligations must be implemented. Treaties based largely
on wishy-washy virtuous statements are being superseded
by agreements that focus on how to do it. This includes
technology exchanges, compliance reporting, and
innovative economic instruments or other forms of
incentives such as global environmental funds, emissions
trading mechanisms and differentiation of responsibilities
for developing and developed nations.
16 See R.W. McGee and W.E. Block, ‘Pollution Trading as a Form
of Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to
Environmental Pollution’, Fordham Environmental Law Journal (1994)
6(1), at 58.
17 OECD, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries: Issues and
Strategies (OECD, 2001), at  27 to 28.
18 D. Harrison, The Distributive Effects of Economic Instruments for
Environmental Policy (OECD, 1994).
19 See J. Huber, Die verlorene Uncshuld der Ökologie (Fischer Verlag,
1982).
20 M.E. Porter and V. der Linde, ‘Green and Competitive: Ending
the Stalemate’, Harvard Business Review (1995) 73(5), at 120.
21 Energy intensive industries and major exporters gained
important exemptions from the proposed tax: J. Sebenius,
‘Towards a Winning Climate Coalition’ in L. Mintzer and J.
Leonard (eds), Negotiating Climate Change (Cambridge University
Press, 1994), 227 at 294.
22 P. Newell and M. Paterson, ‘A Climate for Business: Global
Warming, the State and Capital’ Review of International Political
Economy (1998) 5(4), 679 at 688; see also ‘Energy Taxes and
Emission Permits Get Mixed Response from Business’ ENDS Report
(1998) 284, at 28 (discussing the opposition of UK industry to new
measures to address GHG emissions).
23 See, for example, A.C. Christian, ‘Designing a Carbon Tax: The
Introduction of the Carbon-burned Tax (cbt)’ UCLA Journal of
Environmental Law and Policy (1992) 10(2): 221; OECD,
Implementation Strategies for Environmental Taxes (OECD, 1996).
24 See, for example, Sweden, Ministry of the Environment and
Natural Resources, The Swedish Experience – Taxes and Charges in
Environmental Policy (Ministry of the Environment & Natural
Resources, 1994).
25 The literature on this subject is immense, see, for example, R.
Hahn and R. Stavins, ‘Incentive-based Environmental Regulation: A
New Era From an Old Idea’, Ecology Law Quarterly (1991) 18(1), at
1; R.B. Stewart, ‘Models for Environmental Regulation: Central
Planning Versus Market-based Approaches’ Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Review (1992) 19, at 547.
4 Climate law and economic policy instruments  Benjamin J Richardson : [2004] 1 Env. Liability
There are compelling reasons to include EPIs in
international environmental agreements. First, there are
likely to be greater cost-saving advantages from using EPIs
in a multi-jurisdictional context given that marginal control
costs generally vary more extensively among different
jurisdictions than within a single jurisdiction.26 Countries
differ in economic structure, activity and scale, and just as
these differences create opportunities of comparative
advantage to exploit in international commodity trading,
so too such differences create opportunities for cost-
effectively reducing environmental damage through EPIs.27
Emissions abatement costs in relation to GHGs vary widely
among countries. In 1998 it was estimated that the cost of
domestic reductions in the United States was US$125 per
tonne of carbon compared to US$14 to 23 for such efforts
in developing countries.28 One university study concluded
that inclusion of developing nations in an international GHG
emissions trading scheme would reduce the cost of
achieving the Kyoto Protocol targets in the first
commitment period by some US$120 billion without
trading, and to US$54 billion with trading.29 Emissions
trading should thus reduce the total international cost to
achieve a desired global environmental standard. Because
of these cost-efficiency gains, adoption of EPIs in treaties
should encourage more participation in such treaties than
competing policy instruments could deliver. Conventions
that offer lower costs for parties to achieve desired
environmental goals should thus be more attractive than
alternative treaty proposals.
But there are potential drawbacks. First, for
international emissions trading, there will be greater
demands for international co-ordination because of the
range of issues governments need to reach agreement on,
such as the rules for trading. The need for more decisions
creates risks of states defecting or failing to reach
agreement. Protracted disagreements over the operational
rules of the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading and ancillary
economic tools illustrate such risks. Secondly, by drawing
attention to the costs of environmental goals, the inclusion
of EPIs in treaties makes it politically more difficult for
governments to sign up – an effect of the Kyoto Protocol
on the Australian and United States Governments.30 Thirdly,
EPIs raise equity concerns, such as possible disadvantages
for poorer developing countries unable to compete
effectively in international emissions markets.31 Equity
concerns may also be exploited by nations to avoid
commitments; for example, the United States explained
its decision to not to ratify Kyoto as based on the Protocol’s
failure to impose emissions reduction obligations on large
industrialising developing countries such as China and India,
whom it did not believe deserved concessional treatment.32
Among the various EPIs used internationally, taxation
mechanisms are widely disfavoured. Langley-Hawthorne
argues that ‘an international tax … would require
management by some form of supra-national agency. This
would raise the issue of revenue sharing and it would
probably be difficult to obtain national participation in such
a scheme. Similar difficulties are present when attempting
to negotiate a multilateral agreement to harmonize national
laws in order to impose a carbon tax.’33 Among the few
areas where international environmental taxation would
appear feasible is in the commercial aviation industry, which
is the fastest growing source of GHG emissions.34 Already,
the EU is considering this option.35 An alternative to
taxation is markets in environmental resources or pollution
entitlements to correct the problems stemming from
26 Stewart, Note 7 above, at 222; see W. Fichter, M. Goebelt and
O.  Rentz, ‘The Efficiency of International Cooperation in
Mitigating Climate Change’, Energy Policy (2001) 29(10), p. 817.
27 See generally S.C. Peck and T.S. Teisberg, ‘CO2 Emissions
Control: Comparing Policy Instruments’, Energy Policy (1993)
21(3), at 222; T.H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading (Resources for the
Future, 1985); R.F. Kosobud and T.A. Daly, ‘Tradable Cumulative
CO2 Permits and Global Warming Control’, Energy Journal (1994,)
15(2), at 213.
28 Discussed in L. Rajamani, ‘Re-negotiating Kyoto: A Review of
the Sixth Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change’, Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy:
2000 Yearbook (2000), 201 at 215 to 216.
29 Cited in T. Moore, ‘The Value of Greenhouse Gas Emission
Trading’, EPRI Journal (2000) Summer, 19 at 24. However, other
studies are more cautious, and highlight the risk of market
collusion and dominance that could distort the efficiency of
emissions trading and diminish the expected economic gains: see,
for example, H. Westkog, ‘Market Power in a System of Tradeable
CO2 Quotas’, Energy Journal (1996) 17(3), at 85.
30 See N. Matsuo, ‘Analysis of the U.S.’s New Climate Initiative:
The Attitude of the Bush Administration Towards Climate Change’,
International Review for Environmental Strategies (2002) 3(1), at 177.
31 See K.A. Baumert, J.F. Perkaus and N. Kete, ‘Great
Expectations: Can International Emissions Trading Deliver an
Equitable Climate Regime?’ Climate Policy (2003) 3(2), at 137.
32 K.A. Baumert and N. Kete, The U.S., Developing Countries, and
Climate Protection: Leadership or Stalemate? (World Resources
Institute, 2001).
33 C. Langley-Hawthorne, ‘An International Market for
Transferable Gas Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change’,
Fordham Environmental Law Journal (1998) 9, 261 at 273 to 274.
34 Although air travel presently accounts for only 3 per cent of
global carbon emissions, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) expects airplane travel to account for 15 per cent
of all carbon emissions in 2050: IPPC, Special Report on Aviation and
the Global Atmosphere (IPPC, 1999).
35 On 7 September 2000, the EU Parliament adopted a non-
binding resolution calling for a kerosene tax on airline flights out of
the EU in an effort to reduce GHG emissions attributed to the
airline industry: Environmental News Daily (7 September 2000).
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externalities and degradation of public goods. The 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer was the first international environmental agreement
to incorporate a mechanism to enable state parties to trade
in their environmental responsibilities.36 The Montreal
Protocol was an important precedent for the Kyoto
Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol’s economic mechanisms
The Kyoto target is to have average reductions of 5.2 per
cent from each Annex I industrial nation’s 1990 baseline
emissions rate, to be achieved within the commitment
period 2008–2012. To achieve these reductions, the Kyoto
Protocol offers several flexible mechanisms that co-opt
market forces. The Protocol contains five mechanisms to
give state parties flexibility in implementing their
obligations. The economic effects of the ‘flexible
mechanisms’ crucially depend on how the rules of these
mechanisms are structured. Uncertainties regarding the
operational arrangements for the flexible mechanisms and
the compliance procedures were largely ironed out at the
Marrakech Conference of the Parties in November 2001,
following several years of tortuous negotiations.37
There are two ‘internal’ mechanisms, namely the basket
of CO
2
 and other greenhouse gases (a party can choose
which gases to focus on reducing),38 and the land-use
changes and forestry provisions – the so-called ‘sinks’ –
which allow a party an alternative means to control carbon
emissions.
The most important of the three ‘external’ mechanisms
is international emissions trading. The Protocol allows
Annex B39 industrialised countries to trade their ‘assigned
amount units,’40 that is, the target level of emissions for the
party during the commitment period.41 Such trading must
be ‘supplemental’ to domestic actions. The emissions ‘cap’
for parties is derived from the aggregate of their assigned
amounts. Through the Joint Implementation (JI)
mechanism, industrial nations may also trade in emissions
reduction units by investing in emissions-reducing or sink-
enhancing projects in another industrial nation, provided
such reduction in emissions or enhancement of carbon sinks
is ‘additional to any that would otherwise occur’.42 The
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows industrial
countries to invest in projects in non-Annex I parties and
to use the ‘certified emissions reductions’ (‘CERs’) that
derive from the projects towards compliance with their
Protocol commitments.43 The CERs must be additional to
any reductions that would otherwise occur, and projects
must be approved and supervised by the CDM Executive
Board – an entity appointed by the conference of the
parties.44
The credits acquired through these instruments are, with
certain restrictions, fungible, and can also be banked for
future use in subsequent commitment periods beyond
2012.45 Under each mechanism, a state party facing high
costs in meeting its emissions targets could purchase credit
for reductions undertaken more cost effectively by another
party. Alternatively, a state party that exceeds its
expectations can benefit by selling its surplus emissions
credits. Thus, by exploiting the marginal cost differentials
between countries, emissions trading allows GHG
reductions at the lowest price. Vrolijk and Grubb estimate
that the average cost reduction from allowing emissions
trading and joint implementation is almost 60 per cent
compared to that without these EPIs.46 The main sources
of cheap reductions for JI projects will likely occur in the
economies in transition of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union.47 These countries are much less efficient
energy users and have experienced significant emissions
reductions since 1990: by 2001, some 50 per cent in the
case of Ukraine, and 35 per cent in Russia.48 In addition to
economic efficiency gains, the Kyoto mechanisms should
facilitate markets in environmentally friendly technologies.
For example, utilisation of the CDM should stimulate
investment in renewable energy technologies. Although,
by allowing countries to meet emissions targets through
afforestation and other sinks, the CDM rules may reduce
36 Concluded at Montreal, 16 September 1987; entered into
force 1 January 1989. ILM (1987) 26, at 1550.
37 See S. Dessai and E.L. Schipper, ‘The Marrakech Accords to
the Kyoto Protocol: Analysis and Future Prospects’, Global
Environmental Change (2003) 13(2), at 149.
38 The non-CO2 gases have a higher global warming potential
than carbon, thus providing a wider range of opportunities to
develop clean production processes so as to reduce overall
abatement costs in the long term: see C. Vrolijk and M. Grubb,
Quantifying Kyoto: How Will COP-6 Decisions Affect the Market? (Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2001), at 3.
39 Annex B parties are a subgroup of the parties listed in Annex I
of the FCCC.
40 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3(7).
41 Ibid., Article 17.
42 Ibid., Article 6(1)(b).
43 Ibid., Article 12(3)(b).
44 Ibid., Article 12(4) to (5).
45 Ibid., Article 3(13).
46 Vrolijk and Grubb, Note 38 above, at 6.
47 S. Frankhauser and L. Lavric, ‘The Investment Climate for
Climate Investment: Joint Implementation In Transition
Countries’, Climate Policy (2003) 3(4), at 417.
48 Ibid., 7. See further T. Sabonis-Helf, ‘Catching Air? Climate
change policy in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan’, Climate Policy
(2003) 3(2), at 159.
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motivation to pursue new technologies that actually reduce
emissions in the long term.49
Preventing leakage of GHG emissions to non-parties
will be crucial to the success of the Kyoto Protocol. ‘Carbon
leakage’ arises when carbon emissions abatement in a group
of nations is offset by increased emissions in non-abating
nations.50 As developing countries are not bound to the
Kyoto’s carbon constraints, polluting industries in the West
may prefer to relocate some of their production to such
countries. The CDM attempts to mitigate this problem by
providing developing countries with an incentive to
participate in clean energy projects. Monitoring and
compliance mechanisms are also crucial for combating
carbon leakage: without credible monitoring, reporting and
verification, unsubstantiated credits may be laundered.51 A
further aspect of the Kyoto Protocol that has a bearing on
the carbon leakage is the requirement that emissions
reductions achieved through the Protocol’s flexible
mechanisms should be supplemental to domestic emissions-
reducing actions.52 In other words, governments cannot
aim to achieve their Kyoto targets by primarily buying
emissions credits on international markets in order to avoid
reforming their domestic economies. Whilst there may be
some loss of potential economic efficiency gains arising
from the supplemental rule, by committing industrialised
nations to undertaking domestic reform the rule helps
promote intra-generational equity.53
In addition to the flexible mechanisms, the climate treaty
regime contains another type of EPI. The UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) required
industrialised states parties to finance adaptation
programmes in developing countries particularly vulnerable
to the adverse effects of global warming,54 and to finance
the full cost that developing countries incur in complying
with their emissions reporting obligations.55 A Special
Climate Change Fund was established to help finance
activities to abate CO
2
 emissions in the areas of technology
transfer, energy, transport, land use and waste management,
and to assist developing countries diversify their economies.
A Least Developed Countries Fund has also been created
to enhance the capacity of these countries to respond to
the challenges of global warming, including preparation of
National Adaptation Programmes of Action.56 Thirdly, a
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, financed principally from
a share of the proceeds of the CDM, will support concrete
measures to adaptation projects and programmes in
developing countries that ratify the Protocol.57
Fiscal instruments: pollution taxes
Although largely rejected in international treaties except
levies to contribute to environmental funds, at a national
level, taxes on GHG emissions are often found.58 Pollution
charges and taxes theoretically internalise the cost of the
social and environmental ‘externalities’ of development and
thereby provide financial incentives to discourage
pollution.59 Virtually all industrialised nations apply
environmental charges today in some contexts, primarily
in relation to wastewater discharges, air pollution and
municipal waste collection. Pollution emissions charges are
favoured for fixed point sources such as factories, which
may be monitored relatively easily. Charges are also levied
on environmentally damaging products, such as pesticides.60
Environmental charges have been widely applied within
the EU, with the Benelux and Scandinavian countries having
the most extensive practice.61 The first countries to
systematically tax fossil fuels in the name of climate
protection were Finland and Sweden in the late 1980s, and
later Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway in the early
49 See M. Jung, The Role of Forestry Sinks in the CDM – Analysing the
Effects of Policy Decisions on the Carbon Market (Hamburg Institute of
International Economics, 2003).
50 See S. Felder and T. Rutherford, ‘Unilateral CO2 Reductions
and Carbon Leakage: the Consequences of International Trade in
Basic Materials’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
(1993) 25, at 162.
51 See A. Nentjes and G. Klaassen, ‘On the Quality of
Compliance Mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol’, Energy Policy
(2004) 32(4), at 531.
52 Kyoto Protocol, Article 6(1)(d).
53 Rajamani, Note 28 above, at 215; A.D. Ellerman,
‘Supplementarity: An Invitation to Monopsony?’ Energy Journal
(2000) 21(4), at 29.
54 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
ILM (1992) 31, at 848, Article 4.4.
55 Ibid., Articles 4.3 and 12.
56 These two funds operate under the auspices of the Global
Environment Facility.
57 See European Commission, Summary of the key elements of the
Bonn agreement on climate change (23 July 2001), at
<www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/
pressbckgnd.htm>.
58 The general rationale for taxation mechanisms in
environmental policy is outlined in OECD, Taxation and the
Environment (OECD, 1993).
59 See H. Gensler, ‘The Economics of Pollution Taxes’ Journal of
Natural Resources and Environmental Law (1994) 10(1), at 1.
60 See OECD, Applying Economic Instruments to Packaging Waste:
Practical Issues for Product Charges and Deposit-Refund Systems (OECD,
1993).
61 Among the growing literature, see European Commission,
Evaluation of Environmental Effects of Environmental Taxes (European
Commission, March 1999); P. Ekins, ‘European Environmental
Taxes and Charges: Recent Experience, Issues and Trends’ Ecological
Economics (1999) 31, at 39.
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1990s.62 While gasoline and other energy products have
long been taxed in most countries, this has not been because
of concerns about global warming. Petrol taxes have been
largely a revenue-raising device. Mostly, to date, charge
systems have had limited incentive effects on businesses
because they serve to fund the administrative overheads of
environmental agencies rather than to reflect, and capture,
environmental costs.63
There is hesitation on the part of governments to impose
high pollution taxes.64 The reason is that they increase
businesses’ costs of production and thus the price of
commodities. These financial increases, in turn, can have
sectoral and macro-economic repercussions, depending on
how the pollution taxes are implemented and on the use of
the revenues they generate. There are concerns about the
size of the cost of pollution taxes compared with their
benefits of improved environmental quality and protecting
public health. And even if the public generally accepts that
the benefits of a pollution tax regime would far outweigh
its costs, there could still be concerns about the distribution
of these benefits and costs in society. Damage from GHG
emissions is dispersed and delayed across generations. The
costs of carbon taxes, on the other hand, are immediate
and easily visible, and would be felt by well-identified
constituencies. Of special concern is that companies will
be disadvantaged vis-à-vis competitors (particularly those
that operate internationally) who do not have to pay
pollution taxes.65 The failure of the US Government to
introduce its planned British thermal unit (‘BTU’) tax in
1993 testified to the limits of direct environmental
taxation.66 Similarly, the European Commission in 1991
advanced proposals for a EU-wide carbon tax, but the idea
collapsed in the face of resistance from industry and several
Member States.67 Thus, governments have tended to prefer
to extend general consumption taxes on domestic energy
and to augment road fuel duties rather than be seen to
introduce ‘new’ environmental taxes.
Since the Kyoto Protocol, various governments have
become more receptive to fossil fuel taxes. The EU is an
enthusiastic proponent of EPIs, and in 1997 the European
Commission published a Communication on Environmental
Taxes and Charges in the Internal Market.68 The United
Kingdom, formerly a staunch opponent of carbon
taxation,69 introduced a climate change levy (‘CCL’) in April
2001.70 The levy applies to energy used by industry and the
public sector, but not households, transportation or
registered charities. Renewable energy (with the exception
of large scale hydropower) is exempt from the CCL. The
levy operates, on an economy-wide basis, on a roughly
revenue-neutral basis, as it is offset by a 0.3 per cent
reduction in all employers’ national insurance contributions.
Despite such concessions, the levy has attracted
considerable criticism from industry bodies (although these
have been tempered in recent years) and the CCL has yet
to lead to any obvious changes in energy use or new
investment in environmentally friendly technologies.71
Examples from other countries include a
recommendation by a Japanese Environment Ministry
advisory panel in August 2003 for the adoption of an
economy-wide carbon tax on fossil fuels by 2005.72 The
panel reasoned that if Japan introduces a 30,000 yen tax
per ton of carbon emitted, it can cut CO
2
 emissions by 2
per cent in 2010 from 1990 levels. The Irish Government
has promised to introduce a carbon tax at the end of 2004.73
In New Zealand, a tax on emissions from the agricultural
sector has been considered (in addition to a carbon charge
to be introduced from 2007). The euphemistically described
‘research levy’ would fund research into controlling
methane emissions from New Zealand’s estimated 10
62 See J. Vehmas et al., ‘Environmental Taxes on Fuels and
Electricity – Some Experiences from the Nordic Countries’, Energy
Policy (1998) 27, at 343.
63 P. Thalmann, ‘Environmental Taxes: Analytical Framework’ in
C. Jeanrenaud, (ed.), Environmental Policy Between Regulation and
Market (Springer Verlag, 1997), 35 at 40 to 42.
64 See T.S. Aidt, On the Political Economy of Green Tax Reforms,
Working Paper (University of Aarhus, 1997).
65 See generally R. Baron et al., Competitiveness Issues Related to
Carbon/Energy Taxation (OECD, 1997). In the United Kingdom, for
instance, see D. Maddison and D. Pearce, ‘The UK and Global
Warming Policy’ in T.S. Gray (ed.), UK Environmental Policy in the
1990s (Macmillan, 1995), 123 at 127 to 128.
66 See D. Erlandson, ‘The Btu Tax Experience: What Happened
and Why It Happened’, Pace Environmental Law Review (1994) 12(1),
at 173.
67 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive
Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, COM (92)
226 final (1992). In 1995 the Commission advanced an alternative
proposal, but this was also rejected: see Amended Proposal for a
Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and
Energy, COM (95)172 final (1995).
68 COM (97), 9 February 1997.
69 Maddison and Pearce, Note 65 above, at 138 to 139.
70 B.J. Richardson and K. Chanwai, ‘The UK’s Climate Change
Levy: Is It Working?’ Journal of Environmental Law (2003) 15(1), at
39.
71 Ibid.
72 K. Shimizu, ‘Environment Panel Calls for Carbon Tax in 2005’,
The Japan Times (31 August 2003).
73 Ireland, Department of Finance, ‘Minister for Finance
Announces Consultation Process on Proposed Carbon Energy Tax’
(13 July 2003).
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million cattle and 45 million sheep. But the levy proposal
has faced vociferous opposition from farmers, and its status
is presently uncertain.74 Such political pressures point to a
weakness of EPIs; because, unlike conventional regulation,
environmental charges explicitly reveal the costs involved,
they are prone to generating considerable opposition from
penalised interests.
Some governments are softening the impact of GHG
taxes by allowing businesses to negotiate agreements that
provide for improved energy management in return for a
partial or total exemption from the taxes. Thus, British
companies can reduce their CCL liability by up to 80 per
cent by entering into a Climate Change Agreement with
the government to meet targets for improving energy
efficiency or reducing emissions.75 Only designated energy-
intensive industries (for example, the steel industry) may
participate in the agreements.76 Similarly, in Denmark and
Germany, companies with high energy consumption can
obtain a rebate on their CO
2 
taxes in return for entering
into energy efficiency agreements.77 In November 2002,
the New Zealand Government announced that companies
within the ‘competitiveness at risk’ economic group,
defined as those export-oriented companies for whom
international exports comprise a substantial portion of their
business, would be exempt from the planned CO
2 
charge
if they entered into agreements providing for commitments
to achieve energy intensity targets. So far, it appears that
the climate change agreements are unlikely to induce
significant changes in energy use and efficiency because the
targets tend to be weak and lack credible legal sanctions.78
Beyond such ad hoc fiscal measures, the greening of the
entire taxation system, referred to as ‘ecological tax reform’
or ‘ecological fiscal reform’, is another possibility. The
sobriquet is based on a simple idea: shift taxes off
employment and enterprise, and onto waste, pollution and
scarce resources.79 Ecological tax reform should be
revenue-neutral, aiming merely to shift the tax burden to
produce outcomes that are more favourable for the
environment, rather than to increase taxes. The European
Commission has endorsed this approach, proposing that
eco-tax revenues be applied ‘to decrease other taxes which
are perceived as distorting the economy (such as labour
taxes)’.80 In this way, ecological tax reform may offer the
politically attractive ‘double dividend’ of improving
environmental quality while reducing economy-stifling
taxes on labour and capital.81 A number of national
governments are investigating ecological tax reform, such
as the pioneering study conducted by Canada’s National
Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy.82 Several
EU countries have begun to hypothecate eco-tax revenues
to counter public opposition to green taxation.83 These
include the Scandinavian states, The Netherlands and
Germany.84 So far, Denmark is considered to have gone
the furthest down this path, and in 2001 some 6 per cent
of its tax revenue came from eco-taxes.85
Overall, while governmental experience with
environmental taxation is growing, further research and
work is needed to achieve optimal results. A recent study
of Norway’s carbon tax found that since its introduction in
1991, total emissions had increased but there had been a
significant reduction in emissions per unit of GDP over
the period due to reduced energy intensity, changes in the
energy mix and reduced process emissions.86 The
Norwegian study found that the effect of the carbon tax
had been undermined by extensive tax exemptions and
relatively inelastic demand in the sectors in which the tax
was implemented.87
74 B. Scott, ‘“Fat Tax” Decision A Victory for Farmers’, Gisborne
Herald (18 October 2003).
75 Department of Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, ‘Climate
Change Agreements’, at <www.defra.gov.uk/environment/ccl/
index.htm>.
76 The scheme is restricted to ‘energy intensive’ industries, as
defined in Schedule 1 of the Pollution Prevention and Control
(England and Wales) Regulations 2000.
77 M.M. Roggenkamp et al. (eds), Energy Law in Europe (Oxford
University (Press, 2001), at 412 to 413,
78 D. Waller, The Climate Change Levy and Negotiated Agreements,
Discussion paper (Association for the Conservation of Energy,
2001).
79 See G. Robert, S. Barg and A. Gillies (eds), Green Budget Reform:
An International Casebook of Leading Practices (Earthscan, 1995).
80 European Commission, Environmental Taxes and Charges in the
Single Market, COM(97) 9 final, clause 7.
81 See K. Bubna-Litic and L. de Leeuw, ‘Can our Taxation System
Support “New” Sustainable Industries?’ Environmental and Planning
Law Journal (1999) 16(2), at 140; T. Barker, ‘Taxing Pollution
Instead of Employment’, Energy and Environment (1993) 6.
82 Canada, National Roundtable on the Environment and the
Economy (NREE), Toward a Canadian Agenda for Ecological Fiscal
Reform: First Steps (NREE, Ottawa, 2002).
83 See B. Bosquet, ‘Environmental Tax Reform: Does it Work? A
Survey of the Empirical Evidence’, Ecological Economics (2000) 34:
19 at 21 to 22.
84 See A. Blanke, ‘Ecological Tax Reform in Germany and Interest
Groups’, International Review for Environmental Strategies (2002) 3(1),
at 81.
85 Environment Policy Committee, ‘Environmentally Related
Taxation in OECD Countries: Issues and Strategies’ (OECD,
2001), at 34.
86 A. Bruvoll and B.M. Larsen, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions in
Norway: Do Carbon Taxes Work?’ Energy Policy (2004) 32(4), at
493.
87 See, more generally, P. Ekins and S. Speck, ‘Competitiveness
and Exemptions from environmental taxes in Europe’,
Environmental and Resource Economics (1999) 13 (4), at 360.
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Complex methodological difficulties concerning the
design of carbon and other GHG taxes still need to be
addressed. Moreover, the wider uptake of such taxes may
be constrained by regressive distributional effects unless
special concessions can be introduced that do not unduly
compromise economic efficiency goals.88 The political
acceptability of taxes also requires that their
competitiveness effects be addressed, such as by reducing
taxes in other economic sectors or through international
harmonisation of environmental taxation.89 Without
international standards, progressive countries may have
little choice but to grant numerous exceptions and refunds
to industry by means of protection – actions that hardly
advance climate policy. An alternative possibility is tradable
pollution and resource use rights to achieve environmental
policy goals.
Fiscal I=instruments: subsidies
In addition to fossil fuel charges, governments have been
promoting energy conservation and efficiency through
financial grants and tax concessions.90 Tax benefits for
households purchasing renewable energy, insulation work
in buildings and heating regulation material are now offered
in many jurisdictions. Companies are also claiming
accelerated tax depreciation of energy-saving equipment
and renewable energy production equipment. The range
of fiscal instruments adopted is very extensive. The US
Federal Government, for example, offers a tax credit for
electricity produced from wind, biomass and poultry waste,
where the electricity is sold to an unrelated third party.
Denmark offers reduced vehicle registration fees for energy
efficient cars. Canada exempts ethanol fuel made from
biomass that is blended with gasoline from excise tax.
Germany offers property owners financial grants to
modernise their buildings to enhance efficiency in
production and use of indoor heat.
Many countries offer up-front investment tax
exemptions and grants for renewable energy projects. These
initiatives sometimes take the form of competitive funding
schemes for climate change mitigation projects, financed
directly through fossil fuel taxes or consolidated revenue.
Subsidising the cost of special projects offers important
public benefits. It can support the development and testing
of experimental technologies for emissions control or
renewable energy, which private financial markets may be
unwilling to support. The financial support can take a
variety of forms, including direct grants and taxation
concessions.
The New Zealand Government, for instance, has
established a ‘Projects to Reduce Emissions’ initiative, that
provides financial grants to projects that achieve set
reductions in GHG emissions through new investments in
renewable energy technologies or energy efficiency
technologies, which otherwise would be uneconomic.91
During 2003, the government approved 15 Climate Change
Projects, including wind farms and hydro-electricity
schemes, out of a total of 46 bids received. The United
Kingdom has established, to complement the Climate
Change Levy, the Enhanced Capital Allowances (ECAs)
scheme where investment in energy-efficient products (for
example pipe-work insulation and thermal screens) enables
companies to reclaim 100 per cent of the capital allowance
in the first year.92 The ECAs are administered by the Carbon
Trust, established in April 2001 as an independent, non
profit-making company, to recycle a portion of the Levy
receipts to quicken the adoption of low carbon
technologies.
Tradable emissions allowances
Whereas eco-taxes involve the state imposing a ‘price’ for
using the environment so as to induce people to change
their environmental behaviour, tradable emissions
allowances work on the converse basis. Thus, here the
market determines the price (in this case of traded emissions
allowances) while the state dictates the behaviour through
the emissions ‘cap’ – the total number of pollution
allowances distributed.93 In theory, the creation of exclusive
and transferable pollution rights provide businesses with
an incentive to be more efficient users of the environment.94
88 See D.E. DeWitt, Who Bears the Burden of Energy Taxes?
(Resources for the Future, 1991). Some other studies, however,
suggest that distributive impacts are not significant nor widespread:
see Z.X. Zhang and A. Baranzini, ‘What do We Know about Carbon
Taxes? An Inquiry into their Impacts on Competitiveness and
Distribution of Income’, Energy Policy (2004) 32(4), at 507.
89 See generally T. Barker and J. Kohler (eds), International
Competitiveness and Environmental Policies (Edward Elgar, 1998).
90 See generally P.D. Cameron and D. Zillman (eds), Kyoto: From
Principles to Practice (Kluwer, 2002).
91 New Zealand Climate Change Office, at
<www.climatechange.govt.nz/policy-initiatives/projects/
index.html>.
92 UK Enhanced Capital Allowances, at <www.eca.gov.uk>.
93 The literature on this subject is extensive: see, for example,
Tietenberg, Note 27 above; P. Koutstaal, Economic Policy and Climate
Change: Tradable Permits for Reducing Carbon Emissions (Edward Elgar,
1997).
94 D.A. Malueg, ‘Emission Credit Trading and the Incentive to
Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology’, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management (1989) 16, at 52.
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Trading allows polluters to tailor their regulatory burdens
by transferring the burdens to where they can be borne
most cheaply, and thus allow society to obtain the same
level of overall environmental protection at a lower cost
than conventional pollution law.
A question that arises, therefore, is whether trading is
better than taxing. Many economists see tradable pollution
allowances as superior to pollution taxes, since emissions
trading gives individual firms the chance to reduce their
costs or add value through the trading of emissions units. It
encourages firms with low pollution abatement costs to
reduce their emissions and to sell their emissions units to
those with higher abatement costs, resulting in a lower cost
to the economy overall.95 Beyond such generalities,
however, problems can arise when one looks at the
complexities of specific pollutants. For some types of GHG
emissions, it may not be practical to involve actual emitters
in a trading scheme. Vehicle emissions are an example;
requiring all motorists to purchase (and have the ability to
trade) emissions units in order to operate a car would be
unrealistic. This problem could be resolved, though, if the
obligation to hold emissions allowances were laid on petrol
stations or oil companies.
The United States pioneered tradable pollution rights.
They originated in the 1970s in the air pollution control
programmes of the Federal Environmental Protection
Agency.96 In 1990 the US Clean Air Act97 was amended to
establish a national market for sulphur dioxide emissions
allowances for the power industry.98 Emissions trading
schemes also feature at a state and regional level in the
United States, notably California’s Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market (known as ‘RECLAIM’), which was
introduced in 1994 to reduce nitrogen oxides and sulphur
oxides in Los Angeles.99 Substantial cost savings have been
traced to these initiatives.100
EU interest in marketable permits has grown because
of their potential to control GHG emissions.101 Denmark
was the first EU Member State to legislate for a limited
trading system for CO
2 
quotas for its major electricity
producers.102 Trading is undertaken within a cap and trade
system operated by the Danish Energy Agency, and permits
were grandfathered to firms based on GHG emissions levels
between 1994 and 1998. Sweden is considering a proposal
for a national trading scheme to replace its carbon tax.
Britain launched a pilot system of transferable GHG
emissions allowances in early 2002, as an adjunct to the
climate change levy.103 Participating companies bid at an
auction for a share of the £215 <OK?> ‘incentive monies’
available to entities that meet agreed emissions reduction
targets over the period of the scheme. The 34 organisations
that took on legally binding reduction targets have the
choice of trading just CO
2 
emissions or all six GHGs covered
by the Kyoto Protocol. The average emissions reduction
target set by the auction was 11 per cent below participants’
historic baseline emissions, which should save about 1.1
MtCe of emissions annually that would otherwise occur.104
Rather than allow a proliferation of uncoordinated
national schemes, in October 2003 the EU adopted a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emissions
allowance trading within the Community.105 It provides for
the established of an EU-wide, emissions trading scheme
in CO
2 
among large fixed point sources from January 2005.
It will be the largest emissions trading scheme in the world
to date. The EU Directive is restricted to CO
2
 emissions
(which amount to 80 per cent of the EU’s GHG emissions),
and trading will be open only to major industrial facilities.
The Directive empowers each EU Member State to grant
CO
2 
allowances to companies, within its allocated national
allowance, which may then be traded across the EU among
eligible businesses.
In addition to the traditional cost-efficiency and
environmental gain arguments, several advantages should
95 See Tietenberg, Note 27 above.
96 W. Griffin, ‘The EPA’s Emissions Trading Policy: A Clouded
Past, But a Bright Future’, Northern Kentucky Law Review (1992)
20(1), 207 at 218 to 233.
97 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, Pub. L. No. 104-316,
1001 Stat. 3838 (amending 42 USC 7401-7642 (1955)).
98 See R. Rico, ‘The U.S. Allowance Trading System for Sulphur
Dioxide: An Update on Market Experience’. Environmental and
Resource Economics (1995) 5, at 115.
99 See V. Foster and R.W. Hahn, ‘Designing More Efficient
Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control’, Journal of Law
and Economics (1995) 38(April), at 19.
100 See R.N. Stavins, ‘What Have We Learned from the Grand
Policy-Experiment? Positive and Normative Lessons from SO2
Allowance Trading’, Journal of Economic Perspectives (1998) 12(3), at
69.
101 For a good analysis of the feasibility of a trading mechanism for
GHG emissions in a European context, see P. Koutstaal, Economic
Policy and Climate Change: Tradeable Permits for Reducing Carbon
Emissions (Edward Elgar, 1997).
102 Act No. 376 of 2 June 1999.
103 For details of the UK scheme, see Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions, ‘Business and Climate
Change’, at <www.environment.detr.gov.uk/climateoffice/
10.htm>.
104 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA), The UK’s Third National Communication Under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (DEFRA, 2001), at
31.
105 OJ L275/32.
[2004] 1 Env. Liability : Climate law and economic policy instruments  Benjamin J Richardson    11
flow from the EU-wide trading market.106 Firstly, by
establishing an EU-wide common price for a ton of carbon,
price distortions that would arise if states established their
own disparate national GHG trading systems are avoided.
Secondly, trading is compatible with policies to liberalise
energy markets in the EU. And, finally, the Directive should
enable EU Member States to gain early experience in
international emissions trading before the Kyoto Protocol
system begins.
An alternative to these tradable emissions reduction
targets is energy intensity targets. Canada’s climate change
action plan of 2002 outlines a trading scheme for large
industrial emitters based on energy intensity targets.107 It
works on the basis that the government and industries
negotiate agreements to determine performance targets
based on past actions, technological change, and overall
impacts including the need to accommodate sector growth.
The negotiated agreements are normally targets for
reducing energy intensity rather than a simple emissions
reduction. Participating companies are able to trade among
themselves to find the most cost-effective way to meet their
energy intensity targets. This approach is obviously
problematic, as it does not necessarily entail an absolute
reduction in emissions.
Despite differences in the various emissions trading
schemes, they share many more common features. These
include credible emissions baselines, monitoring and
verification procedures, and proof of ownership of the
emissions reductions. Embryonic and fragmented, the
global market for trading GHG emissions is beginning to
flourish. The World Bank estimates that between 1996 and
2002, at least 200 million tCO
2
e have been traded in some
150 deals, with some 67 million tons of CO
2
e traded in
2002 alone.108 The UN Environmental Programme
estimates that the market will soar to $2 trillion by 2012.109
But emissions trading is not favoured by some nations,
for different reasons. The Australian government announced
in January 2004 that it axed plans to adopt a national CO
2
trading system, citing as reasons continuing uncertainty
over whether the Kyoto Protocol would come into effect
and doubts about whether emissions trading offers industry
sufficient incentives to reduce emissions.110 The New
Zealand Government has also apparently lost interest in
emissions trading, indicating in its Confirmed Policy
Package of November 2002 that it will instead introduce a
carbon charge, capped at NZ$25 per tonne. However, the
government has retained the option for emissions trading
‘if conditions permit’, which according to the government
means if there is a stable international market, and if the
price is reliably under $25 per tonne of CO
2 
equivalent.111
Economic supports for renewable electricity
markets
Taxing fossil fuels may not be enough to tilt the market in
favour of non-fossil fuels. Other EPIs may be needed to
enhance investment in the renewable energy market.112
Some governments are attempting to create protected sub-
markets for renewable energy through price-support
measures and tradable renewable electricity certificates.
Several states have sought to kick-start their renewable
energy sector by obliging electricity providers to accept a
certain percentage of electricity supply from clean fuels.
Under a tradable renewable electricity certificate (‘TREC’)
system, electricity providers are required to source a small
but growing minimum percentage of the nation’s power
supply from renewable sources like wind, solar, biomass
and geothermal energy.113 The TREC schemes can be
adapted for electricity generators or retailers. Electricity
utilities are able to trade their certificates among themselves
to find the most cost-effective means of achieving the
renewable energy obligations. The TREC mechanism is
necessary to help level the playing field for renewables.
The fossil fuel and nuclear power industries are mature,
yet often continue to receive considerable state subsidies.
Moreover, the market price of fossil and nuclear energy
does not include the cost of the damage that they cause to
the environment and human health. Conversely, the market
does not give a value to the environmental and social
benefits of renewable energies.
There are several examples of TREC schemes. Australia’s
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000, requires
electricity retailers to purchase a minimum proportion (with
periodic increases over a ten-year period) of their electricity
106 See G.T. Svendsen and M. Vesterdal, ‘Potential Gains from CO2
Trading in the EU’, European Environment (2003) 13(6), at 303.
107 Government of Canada Action Plan on Climate Change
(Environment Canada, 2002).
108 Prototype Carbon Fund, Annual Report 2002 (World Bank,
2003), at 35.
109 UNEP, ‘Financial Sector, Governments and Business Must Act
on Climate Change or Face the Consequences’, UNEP Press
Release (8 October 2002).
110 S. Peatling and M. Riley, ‘Greenhouse Gas Scheme Gets the
Axe’, Sydney Morning Herald (12 January, 2004).
111 Ministerial Group on Climate Change, Climate Change 1:
Confirmation of Preferred Policy Package, 2002.
112  D.A. Fuchs and J. Maarten ‘Green Electricity in the Market
Place: The Policy Challenge’, Energy Policy (2002) 30(6), at 525.
113 See P.E. Morthorst, ‘The Development of a Green Certificate
Market’ Energy Policy (2000) 28(15), at 1085.
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from renewable sources, and retailers may trade their
obligations among themselves so that the improvements
can be made where they are most cost effective. This scheme
creates a ‘demand pull’ for electricity from renewable
sources and stimulates additional investment in renewable
electricity supply. Alternatively, Britain’s Utilities Act 2000
obliges electricity generators to supply an increasing
minimum proportion of their electricity from renewable
sources. The obligation can also be met by buying renewable
energy supplies from other generators with an ‘excess’
supply. It creates a ‘supply push’ for renewables and
stimulates additional investment in renewable electricity
supply.114 Under both international examples, energy
utilities that fail to meet their requirement must pay a
penalty charge for excess non-renewable electricity. The
United States has pioneered so-called ‘renewables portfolio
standards’ (‘RPS’) that share some similar features to
TRECs. Renewables portfolio standards have been
legislated in numerous states, including Texas, Connecticut,
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota Arizona, Nevada, and Wisconsin.115
In September 2002, California legislated a requirement that
its electricity generators supply 20 per cent of their
electricity from renewable energy no later than 2017 –
the most stringent RPS to date in the United States.116
The main advantage of a TREC scheme is that it improves
economic efficiency. Electricity suppliers and distributors
will have incentives to find the most cost-effective way to
meet their certificate obligations. Low-cost energy
providers will be able to meet their certificate obligations
quickest and sell their certificates first. But, for obvious
reasons, a countervailing weakness is that low-cost (and
possibly low-promising) energy technology options might
push higher-cost more promising options (like offshore
wind) out of the market. The preference for low-cost
technologies could be partly ameliorated by introducing
technology bands of comparable competitive technologies.
However, a problem with this solution is it diminishes the
liquidity of the certificates market, as instead of a single
certificate traded in one single certificate market there
would be separate certificates for electricity sourced from
biomass, wind, biomass, solar-thermal, and so on.
Some further conclusions about the value of TRECs can
be drawn from the Dutch experience, which has operated
a TREC system since 1996.117 The Dutch system has so far
produced mixed results, partly owing to the lack of binding
targets until the end of 1999. The Dutch experience shows
that: (1) the government must set clear intermediate and
long-term targets (policy predictability); (2) energy
certificates should be valid for more than one period
(flexibility to allow for ‘banking’ of certificates); and (3)
the stability and liquidity of the market can suffer where
the TREC is confined to a small domestic economy (as in
The Netherlands).
An alternative measure to nurture renewable electricity
markets is to guarantee purchase prices for renewable
electricity. The guaranteed prices are a premium above the
charges for non-renewable electricity and are set at a level
that allows renewable electricity suppliers to compete more
effectively. The premium can be funded in a variety of ways
such as a special levy on electricity consumers or from
existing government revenue. Empirical studies suggest
energy consumers can be prepared, where they have been
properly educated, to pay a modest premium to support
investments in both renewable energy resources.118
However funded, the guaranteed price should stimulate
investment in renewable electricity supply that otherwise
would not occur. As the renewable energy sector finds its
feet in the market, subsidies could be reduced.
Guaranteed feed-in tariff schemes have been a popular
choice in Austria, Denmark and Germany. The EU common
rules in the EU internal market for electricity allow
Member States to require renewable electricity preference
in dispatching.119 Germany has introduced the most
extensive price supports for renewable electricity. Energy
production from renewables is subsidised at federal, state
and municipality levels. Germany’s Renewable Energy Law
2001 requires producers of electricity from renewable
sources to sell to the power grid at prices guaranteed by
law. The premium is funded from a special levy on electricity
consumers. Non-price support measures also complement
the price guarantees. Germany’s Energy Act 1998 gives
renewable energy sources privileged access to the power
grids in cases of limited capacity, and provides that new
supply installations will not be subject to a permitting
requirement where they primarily use renewable energies.
114 See B. Richardson, ‘Taxing and Trading in Corporate Energy
Activities: Pioneering UK Reforms to Address Climate Change’,
International Company and Commercial Law Review (2003) 14, at 18
115 See, for example, O. Langniss and R. Wiser, ‘The Renewables
Portfolio Standard in Texas. An Early Assessment’, Energy Policy
(2003) 31(6), at 527.
116 SB 1078, Sher, Chapter 516, Statutes of 2002, under Public
Utilities Code ss381, 383.5, 399.11 to 399.15, and 445.
117 See J. Drillisch, ‘Renewable Portfolio Standard and
Certificates-Trading on the Dutch Electricity Market’, International
Journal of Global Energy Issues (2000) 14(2), at 1.
118 See, for example, J. Zarnikau, ‘Consumer Demand for ‘Green
Power’ and Energy Efficiency’, Energy Policy (2003) 31(15), at
1661.
119 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the
internal market in electricity, Article 8(3).
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Although the EU Treaty’s state aid rules potentially restrict
public subsidies in the renewable energy sector, in a
landmark ruling in March 2001 the European Court of
Justice upheld the German guaranteed feed-in tariff
schemes as not being a violation of EU state aid rules.120
A major disadvantage of guaranteed electricity feed-in
tariffs lies in the fact that they often do not provide enough
incentives for investors to drive down costs by means of
technological innovation and/or improvement of
operations. Also, it is very difficult to find (and regularly
adjust) an optimal tariff level for each of the renewable
energy technologies included in the scheme that avoids
excessive profit margins, enhances at least some degree of
economic efficiency, and promotes all technologies in the
manner and to the extent desired. Finally, with such a price-
driven instrument the achievement of a particular quantity
target cannot be safeguarded. The German law attempts to
get around this problem by providing for an annual
reduction of the guaranteed feed-in tariffs for certain
technologies after 2002 (biomass 1 per cent, wind 1.5 per
cent, photovoltaics 5 per cent), in order to reflect expected
technological progress.121
A third EPI that can help the renewable energy market
is a bidding or tendering-based system, which have been
introduced in the United Kingdom, France and Ireland.
Bidding systems contain elements both of guaranteed price
systems and tradable certificate systems. Generators
compete on price for contracts to supply a certain amount
of renewable electricity. Usually the bids are sought for
different bands of technology (for example, solar, wind),
with the cheapest bids in each technology band being
preferred. The most widely studied scheme is Britain’s
former Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) system that was
successful in lowering prices of electricity generated from
renewable energy sources, thus improving economic
efficiency.122 However, its impact on the total volume of
green electricity generated was limited, and the transaction
costs of the system were high (that is, preparing bids, and
their evaluation of authorities).123
Conclusions
Can economic policy instruments alone provide the
machinery to address climate change? The answer is surely
no. Governments will continue to rely on national planning,
building codes, conventional pollution licensing and other
non-economic tools. But the engine room of climate law is
undoubtedly EPIs. No single EPI appears to be preferred
universally; rather, a package of economic instruments will
continue to be applied, with the choices influenced by, inter
alia, prevailing market conditions and regulatory traditions.
So far, experience with taxes, emissions trading and
other EPIs reveals mixed results in terms of improved cost
efficiency and environmental gains.124 Some preliminary
insights can be drawn from existing national experience.
First, ideal systems are rarely assembled from the outset,
and have to be modified over time in the light of improved
understanding. Second, in virtually any application,
establishment of an EPI requires enunciation of a substantial
policy and regulatory framework.125 This is not merely to
protect environmental goals, but to provide certainty for
participants. For a tradable emissions scheme, regulators
need to work out the basis for the initial allocation of
emission rights, and establish credible monitoring and
compliance controls.126 With more extensive experience,
it is likely that the role of EPIs will grow, and there are
certainly no other policy instrument contenders for their
role.
However, complementary institutional and regulatory
reforms to stimulate investment in the non-fossil fuel
energy sector are needed. For example, improved financial
incentives to invest in wind power will be undermined if
municipal authorities that control building approvals remain
hostile to visually intrusive wind farms. According to a
report of the UK House of Commission Environmental
Audit Committee, the success rate of development
applications for renewable energy projects in England and
Wales during the 1990s was only about 26 per cent.127 The
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connection of power generated from renewable energy
projects to the national electricity grid is a further source
of concern. Deregulation of electricity markets has tended
to benefit large energy suppliers, such as nuclear stations
and coal/gas plants, which have the necessary economies
of scale and market leverage. For small energy generators,
whose supplies may be variable and less reliable, there is a
danger of breaching contracted supply levels and so
incurring heavy financial penalties.
A final observation is that the burden of EPIs as a means
of climate law has been mostly on the commercial and
industrial sectors. Governments have been reluctant to
target consumers, perhaps owing to fear of an electoral
backlash. The United Kingdom’s Climate Change Levy, for
example, exempts motorists and residential households.
The British government earlier in 1999 realised the political
stakes involved when fuel price protests in 1999 caused
the government to abandon its fuel duty escalator of annual
petrol tax increases above the rate of inflation. The
Australian Government has rejected carbon taxes
altogether. On the other hand, the New Zealand
Government is planning a carbon charge that is predicted
to add between 2 and 6 per cent to the price of petrol and
about 5 per cent to residential electricity costs. The
Scandinavian countries have already demonstrated a
preparedness to tax consumer energy consumption. But,
on the whole, governments have tended to rely on soft,
non-intrusive measures, including reduced consumption
taxes on home energy efficiency services and materials,
energy efficiency labelling schemes, and periodic consumer
education campaigns.128
128 For example, the Energy Efficiency Commitment, and the
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